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JUDICIAL PROCEEDING - ADjUDICAT[ON OF UNFITNESS - Wilson V.
Barnet, 144 N.W.2d 700 (Minn. 1966) -In a proceeding on a petition of
adoption, the trial court held that defendant, the natural father, in failing
to support his children in disregard of a support decree was guilty of
unjustified neglect. Such finding was held tantamount to a finding of mis-
conduct which warranted permanent termination of the parental right;
hence defendant could not withhold consent to the adoption. On appeal
defendant urged that because the question of hisfitness was not adjudicated
at the divorce proceedings, a later finding of unfitness by the trial court
would improperly extinguish his parental rights. Judgment was affirmed for
plaintiff.
According to the Minnesota statute, a non-custodial parent who with-
holds consent to an adoption has the right to a hearing to determine his
fitness when his parental rights have not been permanently extinguished in
divorce proceedings by a. finding of unfitness. The court adopted the ma-
jority rule, construing the statute to mean that such a hearing may be
properly joined with the hearing on the adoption petition. In such a case,
the standrd to be applied in determining fitess is the same as that used
to determine fitness in a divorce hearing. The court commented that the
better practice is to determine fitness prior to the adoption hearing so as
to avoid basing the decision on a comparison of the qualifications of the
natl and foster parents. The real question is the atural parents' fitness
to retain their parental rights, not whether one home is preferable to an-
other.
ALIENS
EXPULSION - CONSTITUTIONALITY - Boutilier v'. INS, 363 F.2d 488(2d Cir. 1966).- The defendant was admitted into the United States in
1955. In 1963 he submitted a petition for citizenship, at which time he
stated that he was and had been a homosexual since 1950. The immigration
authorities, after further inquiry, determined that he should have been ex-
cluded from entry in 1955 and therefore was deportable as a psychopathic
personality under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, section
24(a)(1). The defendant, relying on Lavoie v. INS, 360 F.2d 27 (4th
Cir. 1962), appealed the case on the ground that the phrase "psychopathic
personality" was unconstitutionally vague and therefore denied him due
process. The court held that it was a legal rather than a medical term and
was constitutional. The defendant was granted certiorari by the Supreme
Court
Today there are two rules as to the right of an alien to constitutional
protection. In regard to exclusion and pre-entry status, an alien has no
constitutional rights, but in deportation and post-entry status, he does have
such protection. Expulsion is deportation for exclusion reasons, and the
law in this area is unsettled.
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APPEAL AND ERROR
AFFIRMANCE - EFFECT OF AFFIRMANCE - City of Tyler v. St. Louis So.
W. Ry., 405 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. 1966). - A railroad brought an original
action in the Supreme Court of Texas for dissolution of an injunction for
changed conditions. In 1920 the court, acting in its capacity as a court of
review, reversed the trial court which had refused to grant an injunction
and, without remanding, enjoined the railroad from removing its offices
and facilities from the city of Tyler. In a separate action the city sought
to hold the railroad in contempt for violation of the 1902 injunction de-
spite the fact that the railroad was removing its facilities under the authori-
zation of the ICC. The Texas Supreme Court held that although the decree
was entered by itself rather than by the trial court, the near-universal rule that
the trial court has exclusive jurisdiction to vacate or modify a judgment
for changed conditions still applied.
The court in support of its decision stated that the trial court alone has
the power necessary in such an action to subpeona wimsses, hear and
weigh evidence, and make findings of fact; the court of review has the
power to enforce, but not to alter such a decree.
CRIMINAL LAW - RIGHT OF PROSECUTION TO REVIEW - State V. Whit-
ney, 418 P.2d 118 (Wash. 1966). - In a criminal prosecution for auto
theft, counsel for defendant advised the trial court that he would object to
admission into evidence of the accused's fingerprints. After the trial judge
signed an interlocutory order denying admission of the fingerprints, the
prosecution applied to the Washington Supreme Court for a writ of cer-
tiorari to review the trial court's ruling. The supreme court observed that
it had been unusual to review either final judgments or interlocutory rulings
in criminal cases at the behest of the state. However, the court held that
certiorari should issue and went on to consider the merits of the state's
case. In dissolving the trial court's order, the court found that the use of
defendant's fingerprints as evidence was an "official use" as authorized by
statute, and that they were thus admissible.
The supreme court indicated that an earlier decision denying review had
been overturned by recent legislation. The power to grant or disallow re-
view to the prosecution in criminal cases was thus shifted from the legisla-
ture to the judiciary. The effect of the legislation has been to broaden
the state's right of review which, according to the court, is part of a trend
reflected by recent decisions throughout the United States. The court
warned that its decision was limited to the problem raised by the errant
interlocutory order and that it did not warrant unlimited appeals by the
state. Despite the caveat, the court in dictum demonstrated its willingness
to continue broadening the state's right to review in order to balance the
interest of the prosecution with that of the defendant.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT
COMPENSATION AND LIEN OF ATTORNEY - SERVICES UNDER ASSIGN-
MENT BY COURT - United States v. Kingston, 256 F. Supp. 859 (W.D.
Pa. 1966). - In issue was the application of counsel assigned by the
court for compensation under 18 U.S.C. 3006A(d) (1964). Two attor-
neys jointly assigned to a case contended that the statutory maximum was
insufficient because of extraordinary circumstances, relief from which is
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provided in the statute. They sought payment of approximately four times
the maximum because of forty-six hours spent in open court and 136 hours
spent in preparation. In limiting compensation to the statutory maximum,
the court stated that the intended extraordinary circumstances, lengthy trial
or complex issues, were not present and that since the case did not concern
a capital offense, the two attorneys' would not share the statutory maximum.
This case is among the first to construe the language of this section of
the Criminal Justice Act passed in response to recent Supreme Court rulings
on the right to counsel.
PRACTITIONERS NOT ADmITrED OR NOT LICENSED - GIVING ADVICE
OR OPINION - Grievance Committee of the Bar of Fairfield County v.
Dacey, 222 A.2d 339 (Conn. 1966). - Plaintiff initiated an action to
restrain defendant from the illegal practice of law. Defendant was en-
gaged in selling mutual funds and estate planning, in the course of which
he prepared wills and trust agreements for his clients. Plaintiff alleged
that by varying the forms of his "Dacey" will and "Dacey" trust to meet
the needs of the client, defendant gave advice which constituted the exercise
of legal judgment. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court's ruling that defendant's activities constituted the illegal practice of
law as prohibited by the Connecticut statute.
Connecticut, like many states, has a statute prohibiting the illegal prac-
tice of law without specifically defining the phrase. Thus, courts gener-
ally must look to defendant's conduct to determine if it falls within the
meaning of "the illegal practice of law." This case presents a standard to
which other courts can look when faced with a similar problem.
AUTOMOBILES
LICENSES - CONDITIONS - People v. Erickson, 273 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1966).
- Defendant moved to dismiss a charge citing him for violation of section
501 of New York's Vehicle and Traffic Law which prohibits the holder of
a junior license from operating an automobile during the nighttime hours
unaccompanied by a parent or one in loco parentis. Defendant's junior
license had been lost; and the duplicate license held by defendant at the
time of arrest did not contain the restrictive conditions of the original
junior license.
The court denied the motion, holding that the statutory limitations were
fixed when the junior license was issued and that any subsequent duplicate
of that license failing to state the statutory conditions could not cause an
invalidation of the limitations. The court reasoned that a license is only
a privilege extended by the state and that the certificate of license is mere
evidence of a license.
BANKRUPTcY
DISCHARGE OF BANKRUPT - BupDEN OF PROOF - Michigan Consol.
Gas Co. v. Wilson, 144 N.W.2d 682 (Mich. Ct. App. 1966). - Plaintiff
brought suit for the unpaid balance of a refrigerator sold to defendant in
March 1963. Defendant testified that he phoned plaintiff corporation to
notify it to repossess the refrigerator since he had filed bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. Defendant did not know to which of plaintiff's employees he
had spoken nor the department with which he had been connected. There-
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after, defendant published notice of bankruptcy proceedings in the Legal
News. The trial court held that defendant did not have the burden of
proving notice of bankruptcy and dismissed the suit on the ground that the
debt was discharged by defendant's bankruptcy.
In reversing, the court of appeals followed the predominant case law of
its own and other jurisdictions and found that defendant had the burden of
proving the creditor corporation's notice. It held that defendant had not
met this burden by his failure to establish the authority of plaintiff's agent
to receive notice of bankruptcy. The court also ruled that a publication of
notice was inadequate where the creditor was a corporation whose claim
was unscheduled.
CONFLICT OF LAWS
ACTIONS - AUTOMOBILES - Clark v. Clark, 222 A.2d 205 (N.H.
1966). - Husband and wife, domiciliaries of New Hampshire, left for a
short trip that was to begin and end in their home state. Their trip took
them into Vermont where an automobile accident occurred, whereupon the
wife brought an action for personal injuries against the husband in New
Hampshire. The court held that New Hampshire law would govern, rather
than that of Vermont, and that the wife, as guest passenger, could recover
for any injuries from her husband, as host.
New Hampshire had previously applied the "mechanical test" for choice
of law adjudication - the governing law is that of the place where the
injury occurred. Later decisions had modified this rule to a limited extent,
due to dissatisfaction with it, but had not completely renunciated the rule
for want of a better test. This case extends prior decisions and breaks
away from the "mechanical test" A new test of considering various policy
factors was adopted. The factors included predictability, maintenance of
orderliness and good relations among the states, simplification of the judicial
task, and the advancement of the state's own interest. The court, applying
these factors "objectively" to the facts of the case, brought New Hampshire
into accord with many jurisdictions and with almost all modern authorities
on conflicts of law.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS - JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE - Patton V.
State, 256 F. Supp. 225 (W.D.N.C. 1966). - After being convicted of
armed robbery and serving almost five years of his sentence, plaintiff was
granted a second trial because he had not been represented by counsel at
his first trial. He was again convicted, and the effect of the sentence was
to deprive him of credit for time already served.
Although the North Carolina courts would not afford him any relief,
the federal district judge felt that there was a violation of plaintiff's rights
under the fourteenth amendment. The violation resulted from the trial
judge's failure to credit plaintiff with time served. The court asserted that
only by stating valid reasons can a trial judge impose a harsher sentence in
the second trial However, the district court felt the circuit court must




PERSONAL CML AND PoLITICAL. RIGHTS - FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF
THE PRESS - City of Cincinnati v. Black, 8 Ohio App. 2d 143 (1966). -
Defendant was convicted and fined under a Cincinnati ordinance which
made it a crime to give away, sell, or offer for sale any pamphlet or paper
which subjects any group of citizens or class to ridicule or contempt be-
cause- of their or its race or religious belief or which "tends to promote
racial hatred or religious bigotry." The court of appeals reversed defend-
ant's conviction, holding that the ordinance was unconstitutional under both
the Ohio and the United States Constitutions as an invasion of the freedoms
of religion, assembly, speech, and press.
In its discussion of the applicable cases, the court noted arguendo that
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) overruled Burke v. American
Legion, 14 Ohio App. 243 (1920) which held that it was an act of criminal
syndicalism to distribute Communist literature and that therefore such an
act would place the person beyond the protection of civil law.
POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDING - RIGHT TO COUNSEL - State v. Mat-
tox, 8 Ohio App. 2d 65 (1966). - Appellant, an inmate of the Ohio
Penitentiary, brought an appeal pursuant to OHIO REv. CODE § 2953.23
after having been denied post-conviction relief under § 2953.21 of the code
by the common pleas court. Appellant alleged he fired his counsel before
his criminal trial began and was forced to go to trial without the aid of
counsel The prosecutor at the post-conviction hearing called no witnesses
but introduced documents and testimony not of record in the original trial.
The judge at the post-conviction hearing, who was also the judge at the
trial, relied on his personal recollection of what occurred at the trial in
considering the truthfulness of appellant's testimony.
The appellate court held that the litigant was entitled to a rehearing
because the judgment of dismissal by the lower court was not supportable
by the evidence, for the records showing appointment of an attorney and
certain pretrial steps taken by the attorney did not refute the testimony of
appellant that he had fired his counsel and was forced to go to trial without
counsel. The court documents and testimony could be given no credence
inasmuch as they were not of record in the original trial and were not
placed in evidence at the post-conviction proceeding. More significantly,
the court held that reliance by a trial judge on his own recollection of
events concerning a trial as a basis for rejecting evidence constituted a de-
nial of the litiganes rights of confrontation, cross-examination, and an im-
partial trial. The court adopted the view that a defendant is entitled to a
hearing where the judgment of dismissal by a lower court was not sup-
portable by the evidence.
RuLES OF EVIDENCE - CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE SECURITIES ACT
- United States ex rel. Shott v. Tehan, 365 F.2d 191 (6th Cir. 1966).
- Appellant, unlicensed as a security dealer, issued a promissory note for
$2,250. He was indicted under the Securities Act requiring licensing for
sales to the public. The statute created a presumption of an unlawful sale
unless the seller proves his sale fell within the statutory exemption of non-
public sales; appellant, however, introduced no evidence regarding this
question. He appealed his conviction, asserting that the statutory presump-
tion of illegality unconstitutionally required him to prove his innocence.
The court held the statutory scheme constitutional because the state is still
required to prove essential elements of the indictment as well as guilt
1967]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
beyond a reasonable doubt. Here there was a general prohibition applicable
to everyone unable to bring himself within the range of an exemption.
The constitutionality of Ohio's Blue Sky Law had previously been up-
held in Hall v. Geiger Jones, 242 U.S. 539 (1916). The specific statutory
provisions had previously been declared within the legislative power of the
state in Catterlin v. State, 128 Ohio St. 110, 190 N.E. 578, appeal
dismissed for want of substantial federal question, 292 U.S. 614 (1934).
Thus, the decision here signifies that reinterpretation of certain constitu-
tional concepts of due process has not effected a change in the constitu-
tionality of Ohio's Blue Sky Laws.
SEARCH AND SEIzuRE - EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN CIVIL CASES - Wil-
liams v. Williams, 8 Ohio Misc. 156 (C.P. 1966). - A motion for a new
trial, premised on newly discovered evidence, was made after a decree for
divorce had been granted to plaintiff, defendant's wife. This evidence, de-
fendant claimed, would show bad conduct on the part of plaintiff. It
consisted of four envelopes containing letters written by plaintiff to a for-
mer fiancee and present friend. Defendant illegally removed these from
plaintiff's car without her consent. In denying the motion, the court, rely-
ing upon Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 634 (1961), held that papers illegally
seized by an individual were not admissible as evidence in civil cases. The
court reasoned that if the federal government and the State of Ohio cannot
use illegally seized papers in court proceedings, a private individual should
not be granted a greater privilege.
Prior to Mapp v. Ohio, Ohio had vascillated regarding the exclusion of
illegally obtained material as evidence in court proceedings. Afterward,
however, Ohio vigorously adopted the Supreme Court's rule that evidence
obtained by illegal searches and seizures is inadmissible in state courts.
A 1964 Ohio case commented that all such evidence was inadmissible.
The instant case appears to be the first one in Ohio to apply the exclusion
rule in a civil case as a direct holding. Dictum in one New York case
is in accord, but the federal courts and the remaining state courts generally
hold the exclusionary rule is applicable only to criminal proceedings or to
proceedings which are criminal in nature.
CONTRACTS
DURATION - WHAT CONSTITUTES TERMINATION - Read v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 150 S.E.2d 319 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966). - The oil company sued to
recover the amount of purchases made by an unauthorized user of a cus-
tomer's credit card. The contract required that the customer accept respon-
sibility for all purchases made with the card and that theft or loss of the
card should be reported to the company immediately. On trial the cus-
tomer offered uncontradicted evidence that prior to the unauthorized use
she had given written notice to the company to cancel the card. The trial
court found for the customer but allowed a motion by plaintiff for a new
trial.
On appeal the court reversed the granting of a new trial, stating that
generally the grant of a new trial would not be disturbed except where it
could be shown that the trial court abused its discretion. Herein, the
uncontradicted testimony stated that the oil company had been notified to
cancel the card, and this was a valid method of terminating the agreement




GENERAL RULES ON CONSTRUCTION - CONSTRUCION To Giv- VA-
L ,DITY AN EFFECt - Ford Motor Co. v. John L. Frazier & Sons Co., 8
Ohio App. 2d 158 (1966). - Plaintiff brought suit, claiming that defend-
ant was liable as indemnitor for damages paid by plaintiff to a third party
in settlement of an earlier suit. Defendant had agreed to perform certain
construction for plaintiff, contracting to assume liability for the negligence
of plaintiff's employees "arising out of or in connection with" its work.
The contract also stipulated that defendant would supply all labor and ma-
terials in performing the contract. The injury to the third party was negli-
gently caused by an employee -not working on defendant's project. The
Ohio court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment awarding ex-
penses and interest to the plaintiff in addition to the dollar amount paid
out by plaintiff in settling the prior suit with the third party.
The appellate court rejected as being too narrow defendant's contention
that damages caused by plaintiff's employees had to occur during the per-
formance of defendant's work before contractual liability would result. The
court reasoned that the effect of the clause holding defendant liable for the
negligence of plaintiff's employees would be nugatory if defendant's asser-
tions were accepted, because plaintiff, by the terms of the contract, had no
role in the performance of defendant's job. In so ruling, the court cited
the time-honored contract principle that each clause of a contract will be
given reasonable effect in construing the agreement.
PERFORMANCE OR BREACH - DISCHARGE BY IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFOR-
MANCE - Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312
(D.C. Cir. 1966). - Plaintiff filed a claim against the United States for
additional expenses incurred in the execution of a charter party for the
carrying of wheat from Texas to Iran when the Suez Canal became closed.
The court of appeals affirmed a dismissal of the libel, holding that per-
formance of the contract was not rendered "commercially impracticable" by
the dosing of the canal where the charter did not specify the route to be
taken and where there was evidence of plaintiff's willingness to assume ab-
normal risks.
According to the more modern application of the contract principle of
"impossibility of performance," a promisor may be excused from perform-
ance where such performance is made impossible, illegal, or merely more
difficult and expensive by the occurrence of some unexpected contingency.
While the court seems wholly consistent with modem authority on the
subject, it is significant that although the holding was based on general
contract principles, constant reference was made to Uniform Commercial
Code §§ 2-614 and 2-615.
PERFORMANCE OR BREACH - DISCHARGE BY IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORM-
ANCE - United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966).
- Plaintiff sought damages for the delay in delivery and ultimate non-
delivery of a computer which defendant had contracted to sell. The de-
fense was that "basic engineering difficultues" had made the contract im-
possible to perform. The court held that the Uniform Commercial Code
should be considered as a source in determining the federal law of sales
and, according to code § 2-615, the alleged difficulties did not relieve de-
fendant of its duty to perform on the ground of "practical impossibility."
The Uniform Commercial Code § 2-615 dealing with the excuse of
performance by "failure of presupposed conditions" excuses performance in
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cases of extreme commercial impracticability. As the first judicial voice on
the subject, the court's application of this section indicates that the provision
is a codification of pre-code contract principles rather than a departure from
existing notions of the doctrine of impossibility of performance.
CRIMINAL LAW
MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL - CONSIDERING MATTBRS NOT IN EVIDENCE
- People v. Cox, 220 N.E.2d 7 (Ill. App. Ct 1966). - During the
course of the trial, a newspaper article presenting matter prejudicial to de-
fendant was published, and he moved the court to inquire of the jury as to
whether they had read the article. The motion was denied. The trial
judge on four occasions cautioned the jury about reading newspapers, and
the record did not indicate that any of the jurors had read the article. Judg-
ment was rendered against defendant.
The appellate court reversed, holding that it is the duty of the court
to determine, if alerted, whether an article contains improper matter which,
if read by jurors, might affect the verdict. Furthermore, the court must
determine if in fact the article was read by jurors.
NATURE AND ELEMENTS OF CRIME AND DEFENSES IN GENERAL - IM-
MUNITY TO ONE FURNISHING INFORMATION OR EVIDENCE - Rutherford
v. United States, 365 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1966). - Defendant was held
in contempt of court for invoking his fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination in a civil damage action brought by the federal govern-
ment under the antitrust laws and the False Claims Act. The decision was
affirmed on appeal with the court holding that the government's suit for
damages was an enforcement proceeding, rather than a remedial action and
was therefore covered by the immunity statute of the antitrust laws (32
Star. 904 (1903), 15 U.S.C. § 32 (1964)).
The court cited and relied on one of its recent decisions in holding that
the joinder of the claim under the False Claims Act, to which the immunity
statute did not apply, did not render the immunity statute inapplicable to
the whole case. In so deciding, the court conclusively presumed that the
testimony sought from defendant would be germane to the antitrust claim
and that he would therefore be immune as to all of his testimony in the
case. The question of the applicability of the immunity statute to a civil
damage suit brought by the government was deemed a novel one, but the
court had little difficulty in finding the statute applicable.
PUNISHMENT AND PREVENTION OF CRIME - CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT-Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Calif. 1966).-
Plaintiff, an inmate of a California penal institution, sought an injunction torestrain defendant institution from allegedly subjecting him to cruel and
unusual punishment stemming from his confinement, pursuant to the order
of a lower level official, for twelve days in one of the institution's "strip
cells." The cell, six feet by eight feet, was devoid of furnishings except
for a toilet which could be flushed only from the cell's exterior. Plaintiff
was forced to remain in the cell absolutely naked for the first eight days
and was provided only coveralls for the remaining four days. He had to
sleep on the cold, concrete floor with only a stiff canvas mat for cover.
For the entire period he was not able to wash his hands or body or brush
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his teeth. No interior light was provided, and dosed flaps outside the cell
prevented the admission of exterior light and air. Plaintiff was denied
medical care prior to, during, and subsequent to his confinement.
The court held that the punishment was shocking to the general con-
science and incompatible with developing concepts of elemental decency.
The court's holding states one of three tests of cruel and unusual punish-
ment.
TRiAL - RECEPTION Op EVIDENCE - United States v. Bozza, 365 F.2d
206 (2d Cir. 1966). - In a multi-defendant trial for various crimes of
burglary, the confession of one defendant was admitted into evidence and
read to the jury with the names of the other defendants deleted. The trial
court in allowing the confession denied a motion by the other defendants
for severance but did instruct the jury not to draw any inferences from
the blanked-out confession other than those relating to the one defendant.
The court of appeals held that the admission of the confession went beyond
the point where it would seem practical that the jury could stay within the
limits set by the court's instructions and therefore reversed and remanded
for retrial as to the other defendants.
The court further noted that there is no conclusive presumption "that
a jury will follow a proper instruction to consider a confession only against
the confessor and to ignore its significance as to other defendants." A test
for such a determination must consider "whether the instructions were suffi-
ciently dear" and "whether it was reasonably possible for the jury to follow
them."
WITNEsss - UNFAI TRIAL TAcrcs - United States v. Compton, 365
F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1966). - Defendant was convicted of travelling in inter-
state commerce with the intent to promote, manage, and establish a gam-
bling establishment in violation of the federal and state statutes. The
question was defendant's intent to establish a gambling place. The jury
inferred such intent from circumstantial evidence. Counsel for plaintiff
examined a witness whose attorney had previously informed the court that
the privilege against self-incrimination would be claimed by asking him if
he had ever made money in the operation of a gambling place other than
the defendant's and by reading, under the guise of a question, a statement
made by the witness to FBI agents that defendant on one occasion had been
in the witness' gambling establishment. On appeal the court reversed the
conviction on the ground that counsel's examination of the witness was an
unfair trial tactic, used only to induce the witness to invoke the fifth amend-
ment and thereby prejudice the defendant in the minds of the jury.
It is established that counsel may call a witness who he knows is going
to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination. However, in doing so,
counsel must have an honest belief that the witness has pertinent informa-
tion which would be admissible under the rules of evidence if no privilege
were claimed. To call such a witness merely for the purpose of inducing
him to invoke the privilege is an unfair procedural tactic. The court here,
while establishing no new law, reaffirms the old interpretation of the nature
of the privilege against self-incrimination, in reasoning that because the
privilege is strictly personal, the exercise of it cannot be used to prejudice
any third party by inference.
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DEATH
ACTIONS FOR CAUSING - WRONGFUL DEATH - Jones v. Pledger, 363
F.2d 986 (D.C. 1966). - Here a wrongful death action was brought by
the administratrix of the wife's estate against the husband's estate for the
benefit of their minor son. The husband had killed his wife and then had
taken his own life. The principle issue at trial was that of interspousal
immunity, which is recognized in the District of Columbia. The trial court
held that such immunity barred this action.
On appeal the case was reversed and remanded; the appellate court
ruled that in this case the reasons for the immunity had disappeared and
thus should be given no effect. The court noted that there had been a
prior separation, that both spouses were dead, and, most important, that the
benefit of the right of action here accrued to the son. In so holding, the
court adopted the majority view that interspousal immunity will be given
no effect where the preservation of marital harmony has no pertinence.
Other jurisdictions, including Ohio, have gone one step further and have
rejected the doctrine of interspousal immunity in toto.
DIVORCE
JUDGMENT OR DECREE - MODIFICAnON - Fisher v. Fisher, 8 Ohio App.
2d 105 (1966). - One year after obtaining an uncontested divorce decree
from defendant in which a separation agreement was incorporated, plaintiff
sought to vacate the decree and modify the court's order. Plaintiff alleged
that by defendant's failure to fully disclose assets, she was fraudulently in-
duced to acquiesce in the separation agreement. The trial court, in giving
judgment to the plaintiff, declared the separation agreement void, but did
not vacate the divorce decree. These determinations were made by a hear-
ing on the merits. The court of appeals in reversing held the trial court
did have jurisdiction but committed prejudicial error by hearing the con-
troversy on its merits. Applying OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2325.06-.07, it as-
serted that it was the duty of the court to first try the grounds for vacation
or modification, then to determine whether plaintiff had a good cause of
action, and if both are determined in the affirmative to suspend the earlier
judgment; this would then result in a determination, as a matter of law,
of the validity of the defenses raised by defendant.
By holding that the court did have jurisdiction, the court followed the
majority rule that concealment of assets and misrepresentations is not in-
trinsic fraud and that they furnish the basis for reopening a divorce decree.
FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE
INTERPLEADER - RIGHT To INTERPLEAD - Underwriters at Lloyd's v.
Nichols, 363 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1966). - Plaintiff insurer had issued a
twenty-thousand-dollar liability policy to an Arkansas crop spraying com-
pany. Spraying operations damaged several cotton fields. There were
eighteen possible claimants whose claims totaled near fifty thousand dol-
lars; of these, two suits had been filed in Arkansas courts totaling twenty-
five thousand dollars. The insurer could not be sued directly by the claim-
ants since Arkansas does not have a direct action statute. Plaintiff filed a
bill in the nature of interpleader under FED. R. Civ. P. 22(1) alleging it
might be required to pay sums in excess of the policy limits if it paid the
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initial successful claimants from the policy funds and it was later deter-
mined that the claimants should have shared in the insurance on a pro
rata basis. The circuit court, reversing the district court, allowed the bill.
In Pan Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Revere, 188 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. La.
1960), interpleader was allowed on similar facts although Louisiana did
have a direct action statute. However, the only other case on similar facts,
and where a direct action statute was not involved, National Cas. Co. v.
INA, 230 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Ohio 1964), refused to allow interpleader.
The Eighth Circuit refused to follow the INA ruie because of its lack of
cogent reasoning.
INSURANCE
INDEMNITY INSURANCE - LIABILITY OF INSURER - Harleysville Mut.
Cas. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 150 S.E.2d 233 (S.C. 1966). - The
insured, driving without the owner's consent, was involved in a collision.
Three lines of the liability policy, encompassing the omnibus clause, stated
the coverage as extending to "(1) the named insured, (2) any relative,
provided" the car was being driven with the owner's consent. The word
"provided" began line three and was located directly beneath the "(2)" of
line two.
Finding an ambiguity as to whether the "provided" in line three modi-
fied line one, the court construed the contract against its draftsman, the in-
surer, holding that line three did not modify line one and that the insurer
would thus be liable for all valid claims against the driver. The courrt
applied basic insurance law in reaching its decision. However, only two
other cases have considered similar factual situations and they are split in
their determinations.
JOINT TENANCY
CREATION - EXISTENCE - In re Estate of Svab: Beaver v. Redmond, 8
Ohio App. 2d 80 (1966).- The financial affairs of decedent, an elderly
woman, were managed by her daughter, the appellant. Bank accounts had
been opened in the name of decedent, and several weeks later, joint and
survivorship cards signed by decedent and appellant were filed with the
bank. The bank did not add appellant's name to the passbook, nor did it
follow any particular procedure for creating a joint and survivorship ac-
count. The only notation other than the decedent's name made on the
account card was the original deposit. The probate court upheld the admin-
istrator's claim of the accounts for the estate. It further held the bank had
not accepted them as joint and survivorship accounts and that the intent of
the decedent to create such accounts had not been shown.
In affirming the probate court, the court of appeals, not finding any
cases in point, set forth the following requirements for the creation of ajoint and survivorship account: a bank must affirmatively accept the con-
tract, and the acceptance must be indicated on the bank's records, the passbook,
the ledger card, or by a notation made by a bank official on a joint or
survivorship signature card. Furthermore, the court said that when a confi-
dential relationship exists between the depositor and the beneficiary of this
type of account, a presumption of undue influence arises which must be
rebutted by the beneficiary.
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LABOR
CONTRACTS - CAPACITY To SUE - Brown V. Sterling Aluminua Prods.
Corp., 365 F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1966). - Plaintiffs, members of the em-
ployees' shop committee, filed an action under § 301 of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act of 1947 claiming breach by defendant company of their
collective bargaining agreement. Due to adverse economic conditions, the
company had closed and relocated the plant wherein plaintiffs worked and
had refused to bargain with the shop committee concerning relocation of
the plant. The union had brought suit against the company, alleging a
breach of the collective bargaining agreement, but the action was dismissed
with prejudice to the union. In affirming the district court's decision in
the instant case, the Eighth Circuit followed the prevailing view in holding
that individual employees lack standing to compel discussion of broad col-
ective bargaining principles such as relocation of a plant and, under the
circumstances, the company could close its plant and relocate elsewhere
without incurring individual liability to each of its employees.
The federal courts have allowed individual members of a union to bring
actions under LMRA § 301 to enforce their individual rights when certain
prerequisites have been met, such as seeking use of established grievance
machinery and affording the union an opportunity to act on the employees'
behalf. However, the individual must be seeking to enforce a personal
right rather than one possessed by the bargaining unit as a whole.
LIBEL AND SLANDER
CORPORATIONS - DuE PROCESS - New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365
F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1966). - Appellant, a New York newspaper publisher
with a circulation in Alabama of 395 daily copies out of a 650,000 national
circulation was sued for libel by appellee, a City Commissioner of Birming-
ham, Alabama. Appellant had no offices or agents in Alabama and mailed
all papers to its readers. Appellee contended that appellant's writer had
maliciously defamed his official conduct in an article about racial fear and
hatred in Birmingham prior to and during civil rights sit-ins.
In reversing a forty-thousand-dollar judgment for appellee, the court of
appeals found that appellant's business in Alabama lacked sufficient mini-
mum contacts for service of process'under the state's long-arm statute and
that the tort of libel requires a greater showing of contacts than other
tortious activity because of due process clause and first amendment consid-
erations.
LICENSES
OCCUPATIONS AND PRIVILEGES - TRANSACTIONS SUBJECT TO TAX IN
GENERAL - Community Telecasting Ser'. v. Johnson, 220 A.2d 500 (Me.
1966). - Plaintiff filed a complaint to review the action of the state tax
assessor in imposing a sales tax on art work and slides prepared by plaintiff
for their advertising customers and in imposing a use tax on market surveys
purchased by plaintiff. The supreme court held that, under Maine's Sales
Tax Act, the art work and slides were subject to the sales tax whereas the




Each state which has adopted some form of sales tax has also adopted
its own definition of the term "sale" or "retail sale." The state's taxing
policies, along with the statutory definition of "sale," determine which trans-
actions are held subject to the tax. While no general rule exists in this
area of law, the Maine court's classification of a professional market survey
as a service and the preparation of art work and slides as a sale, is in accord
with the prevailing notions of "service" and "sale."
LIENS
MECHANICS' LIENS = INTEREST AND COSTS - Capital City Lumber Co.
v. Ellerbrock, 7 Ohio App. 2d 202, 220 N.E.2d 141 (1966). - Appellee
was a subcontractor who had furnished labor and material to the prime
contractor who had been hired by appellant to construct a house. The
prime contractor failed to pay appellee, and he filed a mechanic's lien
against appellanes house. The trial court entered a judgment for appellee
in the amount of the debt plus interest thereon at the rate of six percent
per annum and foreclosed the lien. On appeal the judgment was modified
to disallow the claim for interest (which amounted to over twelve hundred
dollars) and affirmed as modified.
The court held that under Ohio law the foreclosure proceeding was in
rem rather than in personam and that the statute which allegedly gave
appellee the right to interest was inapplicable since there was no privity of
contract and no personal obligation between appellant and appellee. The
court found no Ohio cases in point and recognized that numerous decisions
of other jurisdictions had allowed similar interest claims, but it found that
the allowance of interest was not authorized by the Ohio statute.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - STATUTORY AND MUNICIPALI REGULATION -
Leet v. City of Eastlake, 7 Ohio App. 2d 218, 220 N.E.2d 121 (1966).-
A city ordinance required real estate brokers to obtain a permit for display-
ing "for sale" signs which served as advertising. The permit cost twenty-
five dollars, and it was contended that this was a valid exercise of the mu-
nicipality's police power. The court, in passing on the validity of the or-
dinance, agreed that the municipality could regulate the broker's advertising,
but because the ordinance was not designed to effectuate its goals, the court
found it was unconstitutional.
The decision is supported by the fact that the purpose of the ordinance
was to regulate advertising, but the interpretation of the ordinance was such
that, without obtaining a permit, the broker could place his name in front
of houses which were for lease or for rent. Thus, the effect of the ordinance
was questionable.
POLICE POWER AND REGULATIONS - PROHIBITORY ORDINANCES - City
of Eastlake v. Ruggiaro, 7 Ohio App. 2d 212, 220 N.E.2d 126 (1966).
Conviction of a parent for violation of a municipal curfew ordinance was
appealed on questions of law. The ordinance makes it unlawful for parents
to "allow" a minor to violate the curfew. Defendant's son, age sixteen, was
arrested for breaking and entering a gas station at 3 am., but defendant
believed that his son was spending the night at the home of a friend.
The court held that curfew ordinances do not violate constitutional rights
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of minors if the curfew is "within the bounds of reasonableness." The
court also held the ordinance to be valid as applied to parents when "allow"
is interpreted to mean "permit" or "neglect to restrain or prevent," which
requires actual or constructive knowledge on the part of the parent. Under
this interpretation, defendant's conviction was against the manifest weight
of the evidence. Therefore, the conviction was reversed.
Although many cities have curfews, litigation has been infrequent and
the results inconsistent. The court in the instant case emphasized the neces-
sity of reasonableness in interpretation of such ordinances to prevent possible
violation of constitutional rights. This requires that curfews not be ab-
solute but should allow justified exceptions as applied to both the minors
and their parents.
NEGLIGENCE
AUTOMOBILES - MASTER AND SERVANT - Weber v. Stokely-Van Camp,
Inc., 144 N.W.2d 540 (Minn. 1966).-Plaintiff-employer was riding in his
truck, operated by an employee during the course of his employment, and
there was a collision between the vehicle and one operated by defendant's
agent. Plaintiff suffered personal injuries along with damage to his truck
and sued defendant for the negligence of his agent. Defendant denied his
agent's negligence and alleged that the contributory negligence of plaintiff's
employee, when imputed to plaintiff, would bar recovery.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota refused to sustain the trial court's
instructions on imputed negligence and held that the contributory negligence
of plaintiff's servant was not as a matter of law imputed to plaintiff so as
to bar his recovery. The court abandoned the "both-way test," previously
followed and still adhered to in other jurisdictions, which holds that if the
master is vicariously liable to a third party, his servant's negligence is im-
puted to him to bar recovery. The rule was considered illogical since the
reasons for holding the master liable for his servant's negligence fail when
the faultless master seeks recovery against a negligent third party.
CARE As TO LICENSEES OR PERSONS INVITED - IN GENERAL - Gorby v.
Yeomans, 144 N.W.2d 837 (Mich. Ct. App. 1966). - Plaintiff, while a
customer in defendants tavern, sustained personal injuries when another of
defendant's patrons assaulted him. A barmaid was the tavern's only per-
sonnel on duty at the time of the assault. Even though the argument and
physical altercation between plaintiff and the patron lasted at least five
minutes, no steps whatever were taken by the tavern to stop the disturbance.
The court upheld a verdict for plaintiff on the ground that there was
sufficient evidence for the jury to find that defendant had breached a com-
mon law duty to plaintiff by failing to provide him with a safe place. This
duty arose when the tavern failed to provide an adequate staff to police
the premises and failed to take any measures to stop the disturbance.
DEFECTS IN PREMISES - QUESTIONS FOR JURY - Seelbach v. Cadick,
405 S.W.2d 745 (Ky. 1966). - A family checked into appellant's hotel
and were told that the hotel could not provide a baby bed for their eight-
month-old infant. In order to secure the infant, the parents pushed one of
two double beds against the wall and placed upon this bed a suitcase to
protect the infant from exposure to a hot radiator which extended from an
opening in the wall. The infant evenutally fell or crawled off the bed and
sustained severe burns. The court held that there was sufficient evidence
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for the jury to conclude that the hotel failed to furnish reasonable accom-
modations for the infant since the presence of an instrumentality of potential
danger in the room made necessary a provision for the infant's bed. In
addition, the court ruled that the jury could find appellant's negligence a
proximate cause of the injury even if the parents should be found concur-
rent joint tort-feasors, since the liability of the original wrongdoer will not
be cut off by the negligent act of another performed in response to existing
negligent conditions.
The court restated the majority rule which places upon innkeepers the
duty of exercising a higher standard of care toward infants than toward
adults. In addition, Kentucky precedents and the instant case are in accord
with many jurisdictions which do not require a wrongdoer to foresee a
subsequent negligent act but only some act in response to the negligent
condition.
PRECAUTIONS AGAINST INJURY - DUTY OF INSPECTION - Metz V.
Haskell, 417 P.2d 898 (Idaho 1966). - A radio and television service
employee brought this action to recover damages for injuries caused by his
falling from a defective ladder supplied by defendant motel owner. In re-
versing the lower court, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the "simple
tool" doctrine, which relieves the supplier of the duty to inspect, is not
applicable in situations where the supplier is in a superior position than the
user to observe defects.
Generally, the "simple tool" doctrine is a well-established bar to recovery
in negligence cases and remains so in this state. However, Metz establishes
an important precedent by placing the duty of inspection on the supplier
in certain situations.
ARENT AND CHILD
CUSTODY OF CHILD - "BEST INTEREST" T.sT - Halstead v. Halstead,
144 N.W.2d 861 (Iowa 1966). - Petitioner brought a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding to obtain custody of her twelve-year-old son who had been living
with his grandparents for the past ten years. During this period, the mother
had been married several times and had visited her son only infrequently.
The trial court found for the mother, but the supreme court, on appeal,
held that since the proceedings involved the custody of a child it could hear
the case de novo and was not bound by the findings of the lower court,
although they were to be given weight.
The supreme court reversed the trial court and remanded for a decree
in accordance with its opinion that while the statute called for the parents,
when qualified, to be preferred over all others, the ultimate test must be
what was in the best interest of the child. In utilizing this "best interests"
test, the court followed a new trend in the law away from the strict parental
theory. This new test is in use in about half the states and has been
adopted by the American Bar Association in its Model Custody Act.
SALES
WARRANTIES - IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY - Miller v.
Preitz, 221 A.2d 320 (Pa. 1966). - Suit was brought in assumpsit for
breach of an implied warranty of merchantability on a defective vaporizer-
humidifier which had caused appellants death by spraying boiling water
on him. Appellant was the nephew and next-door neighbor of the pur-
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chaser. The court held that whether a party is within the meaning of
family under section 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code was a question
of fact as were such inquiries as remoteness of family relationship, geo-
graphical connection between the buyer and the member, and the nature
of the product. The court held that appellant was within the family, thus
giving him the right to recover. However, the court limited this right to
a suit against the immediate seller and affirmed the lower court's decision
for the manufacturer and the distributor because of lack of vertical privity.
This is the first Pennsylvania decision allowing a member of the family
to recover under implied warranties under the UCC. However, against
the well-argued opinions of the dissenting judges who desired the abolition
of privity entirely, the majority stepped back from the national trend into
the settled case law of Pennsylvania by requiring vertical privity in the dis-
tributive chain except in food and drug cases.
TAX
INHERITANCE AND GIFT TAXES - RATE OF TAXATION - Depositors
Trust Co. v. Johnson, 222 A.2d 49 (Me. 1966). - The assessment of in-
heritance tax due the state from plaintiff was based on the assessor's ruling
that plaintiff was not the testator's stepchild at the time of death because
the child's natural mother, a former wife of decedent, had died and the
testator had subsequently remarried. The child was thus denied the prefer-
ential inheritance tax rate given stepchildren by Maine's inheritance tax
statutes. The supreme court held the ruling to be incorrect. The dear
legislative intent, the court stated, was equality of treatment of stepchildren
for inheritance tax purposes in light of the continuance of affinity between
the stepparent and stepchild subsequent to any dissolution of the marriage
which had created the relationship.
The court's construction of the Maine statute, which on its face is in
derogation of the common law rule that the "step" relationship confers no
rights nor imposes any duties, is in line with the majority of jurisdictions
and adds to the modern trend towards construing statutory language so as
to grant the same benefits to both stepchildren and natural children.
WILLS
CONSTRUCTION - VESTED OR CONTINGENT ESTATES AND INTERESTS -
Northern Trust Co. v. North, 220 N.E.2d 28 (Ill. App. Ct. 1966). - By
the terms of a will establishing a trust fund, a life estate in the proceeds
was bequeathed to a friend of the testatrix with a remainder interest in
the testatrix's son or his descendants, but if the son were to leave no de-
scendants, the remainder was to be subject to an executory interest in her
brother and sister. The will contained a spendthrift provision that distri-
bution must be made to each beneficiary personally. In this action by the
trustee to construe the will, it was contended on behalf of the son, a de-
fendant, that the operation of the spendthrift clause postponed the vesting
of the remainder interest of the testatrix's brother and sister until actual
distribution upon the death of the life tenant and that, since neither survived
the distribution, their remainders never vested and the proceeds of the trust
passed to the estate of the son by intestacy. As an alternative construction,
it was contended that the spendthrift clause required that the brother and
sister survive the son and that since the brother predeceased the son, one
half of the son's remainder interest was never divested. In answer to these
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contentions, the court held that the spendthrift clause, not dispositive in
character, must yield to the intention of the testatrix as evidenced by the
will as a whole; accordingly, distribution was awarded to the sister and
the deceased brother's estate as holders of an executory interest.
I In so holding, the court reached the classical result that a construction
is preferred which leads to a vested and not a contingent interest. Exam-
ining earlier Illinois cases, the court determined that in no prior case had
such a construction as urged by the son been allowed to fly in the face of
other provisions showing an opposite intent of the testator. The court's
opinion followed the well-established rule that no provision, including a
spendthrift clause, will prevail over the testator's intent.
WITNESSES
PRIVILEGES OF WITNESS - PERSONS ENTITLED To CLAIM PRIVILEGE -
United States v. Cogan, 257 F. Supp. 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). - Respondent
claimed fifth amendment privileges against self-incrimination in refusing to
comply with a grand jury subpoena duces tecum commanding him to de-
liver financial records of six small general partnerships of which he was a
partner. When petitioner sought a court order compelling production, re-
spondent resisted and asked that the subpoena be quashed. In granting
respondent's cross-application, the district court held that respondent had a
personal rather than "custodial" interest in the documents, enabling him to
invoke the "personal" privilege of the fifth amendment to avert disclosure.
Petitioner rested its case on the authority of United States v. White,
322 U.S. 694 (1944), which had disallowed fifth amendment objections
of a union officer to the production of union records. The Supreme Court
in White had reasoned that the union was an "impersonal organization"
representing the interests of its membership as a group rather than as indi-
viduals. The union and its representatives had only a custodial interest in
the documents, which could not prevent disclosure. In distinguishing later
cases in which it had held that "quasi-corporate" limited partnerships were
sufficiently "impersonal" as to fall within the White rule, the district court
denominated respondent's partnerships as a "personal organization." The
court warned that the actual organization of a business group, not its nominal
classification or its economic success, was determinative of "impersonality"
for fifth amendment purposes.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
INJURIES WHILE GOING TO OR COMING FROM WORK - FURTHERANCE
OF EMPLOYER'S BUSINE-S - Burchett v. Delton-Kellogg School, 144 N.W.
2d 337 (Mich. 1966). - Plaintiff, a Michigan school teacher, attempted
to collect workmens compensation for injuries incurred in an automobile
accident on her way home. She pleaded and proved that doing work at
home was a required part of her job since teachers have no time during the
school hours to grade papers and prepare future lessons. The court held
that the "dual purpose" doctrine should be considered as to those injured
going to or coming from work.
In overruling a prior case which denied compensation under similar
facts, the court asserted that although this exception for teachers has not
been widely considered, the requirement of doing homework necessitated
an extension of the "dual purpose" doctrine to Michigan teachers.
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